In Re Adoption of Charles B. - A Tough Act to Follow by Arik, Deborah M.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
In Re Adoption of Charles B. - A Tough Act to
Follow
Deborah M. Arik
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Family Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and
the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arik, Deborah M. (1991) "In Re Adoption of Charles B. - A Tough Act to Follow," Akron Law Review: Vol. 24 : Iss.
2 , Article 8.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/8
IN RE ADOPTION OF CHARLES B. -
A TOUGH ACT TO FOLLOW
INTRODUCTION
Society has looked upon homosexuals' with disgust, anger and fear. 2 In In re
Adoption of Charles B.,3 the Ohio Supreme Court took a giant step toward reducing
society's intolerance and fear of homosexuals. The court held that homosexuals are
not, as a matter of law, ineligible to adopt. The court allowed a homosexual male
to adopt an eight-year-old boy.'
This Note first discusses homosexuality5 and examines Ohio's position on
adoption,6 child custody,7 and custody disputes involving homosexualparents." The
Note then reviews other states' positions on homosexual adoption. 9 The remainder
of the Note analyzes the Charles B. decisions1" and discusses future questions that
the Court will need to answer."
BACKGROUND
A Historical Perspective of Homosexuality
In this country, sodomy was a criminal offense at common law.12 Until 1961,
sodomy was outlawed in all 50 states." Today, twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia have statutes that outlaw sodomy between consenting adults in
private. 14 Twenty-one states have decriminalized sodomy.' 5 Two states' sodomy
'In this Note, the term "homosexual" is used to refer to those persons with a preference of sexual and
emotional relations with aperson of the same sex. See V. Buu2ouoH, HOMOSExuALrY: A HISTORY 7 (1979).
21. SLOAN, HOMOSEXUAL CoNwucr AND Tha LAw 35 (1987).
50 Ohio St. 3d 88, 552 N.E.2d 884 (1990).
4 Id. at 90, 552 N.E.2d at 886.
See infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 25-43 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 97-177 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
121Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,192, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986). In Bowers, theU.S. Supreme
Court upheld Georgia's sodomy statute against a homosexual's due process challenge. Id. at 196. The
nation's high Court refused to find a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Id. at 191.
" Id. at 193.
14Id.
"5SLOA, supra note 2 at 10. The American Law Institute's proposed official draft of the Model Penal Code
decriminalized all adult, consensual, private, sexual behavior. See Model Penal Code 213.2 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962). The Texas sodomy statute, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974) was found
to be unconstitutional by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, in Baker v.
Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, opinion supplemented, 106 F.R.D. 526 (1982). The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the lower court decision, finding that the statute did not violate the constitu-
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statutes have withstood constitutional scrutiny.16 Two states' sodomy statutes have
been declared unconstitutional.1 7 The United States Supreme Court has declared
that the United States Constitution does not give homosexuals a fundamental right
to engage in sodomy.1
At least fifty counties and municipalities have passed legislation that bar
discrimination against homosexuals. 19 Thirteen states also have laws that prohibit
discrimination against the handicapped, including AIDS victims.20 By administra-
tive rule, however, the federal government does not recognize homosexuality as a
handicap. 21 In the military, homosexual activity can be a court-martial offense under
Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.22 Yet, the United States Civil
Service Commission's guidelines forbid discrimination against homosexuals. 23
In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association unanimously voted to drop
homosexuality from the registry of mental illness.24
Ohio Adoption Statutes
Historically, common law did not recognize the right of adoption.25 Today,
however, adoption is a creature of statute. No adoption is possible unless the parties
meet the requirements of the applicable statute.26 Adoption statutes are strictly
construed.27
tional protections ofprivacy and equal protection. 769 F.2d 289, 292, reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1002, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1035 (1986).
"1 VA. CoDE ANm. § 18.2-361 (1988) by Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney forRichmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975), aff d 425 U.S. 901, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976) and GA. CoDE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)
by Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986). In the Virginia case,
the state criminal sodomy statute was unheld as constitutional by the federal district court and was affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court. In the Georgia case, the federal district court found the state statute
to be unconstitutional and the United States Supreme Court reversed.
"' Both statutes were declared unconstitutional on privacy and equal protection grounds. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 13-.38 (McKinney 1977) by People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y. 2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3124 (1973) by Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa.
91,415 A.2d 47 (1980).
" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
19 R. Mor, GAYs/JuscIc: A STUrY OF Emucs, Soasiy & LAw 43 (1988). Municipalities include Los
Angeles, Boston and New York. Id.
20 Stow, supra note 2, at 18.
2 45 C.F.R. 4, appendix A at 346 (1988).
- 10 U.S.C. 925 (1983).
3 M RusE, HoMosaxuALm: A PawopmcAL HtsvaRy 240 (1988).
'Id. The 1987 version of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual HI no longer discusses homosexuality and
classifies "persistent and marked distress about one's sexual orientation" as a Sexual Disorder Not
Otherwise Specified. As.ucANPsyouAmAcAssocAnoNDSMIlI-R: DAGNOSTIcANDSTAsTICAL MANUAL
Op MNrAL DisoRDnts 296 (3rd ed. rev. 1987).
1 In re Adoption of Huitzil, 29 Ohio App. 3d 222, 223, 504 N.E.2d 1173, 1175 (1985).
26 Id.
27 Id.
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In 1977, the Ohio legislature revamped the statutory scheme.28 The legislature
inserted a new section entitled "Who May Be Adopted. 29 The revision widened the
class of persons eligible to adopt. At this time, the legislature could have expressly
forbidden homosexuals to adopt." The current version of the statute31 permits adult
adoptions, but effectively prevents a homosexual adult from adopting another
homosexual adult.3 2
Ohio Adoption Case Law
Prior to 1977, courts were permitted to consider the respective racial, religious
and cultural backgrounds of the parties." However, these factors were not control-
ling. If the best interests of the child mandated, children were placed in homes with
parents of different racial,3 religious,3" or cultural 36 backgrounds. Where the age of
the parents was the single negative factor amidst other otherwise qualifications,
denial of the adoption was arbitrary, capricious and violative of the whole adoptive
system. 37
The best interests of a child are paramount; they supersede procedures such as
a formal waiting list for adoptive parents. The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals
overturned a denial of an adoption because the foster parents were not on the agency
waiting list.39 Denial of the adoption would have relegated the child's need to find
a home to the parental needs and desires of individuals on agency waiting lists.40
In Ohio, relatives have no preferential legal right to adopt.4' The law does not
Huitzil, 29 Ohio App. 3d at 225, 504 N.E.2d at 1176.
29 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.02 (Baldwin 1988). Former 3107.02 "Who May Adopt" was moved to its
current position in 3107.03 and provides in relevant part: "The following persons may adopt: ... An
unmarried adult[.]"
30 Two states statutes forbid homosexuals to adopt. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1985) (amended
1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (Supp. 1989) (amended 1987).
1' Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.02 (Baldwin 1988) (effective September 20, 1984). The Huitzil court
examined the legislative history behind the adoption statutes and held that the Ohio legislature clearly did
not intend to permit any adult to adopt any other adult. 29 Ohio App. 3d at 225, 504 N.E.2d at 1176.
32 One of the conditions of the statute is that a child-foster parent or child step-parent relationship must be
established during the adoptee's minority. See Ohio Rev. Code 3107.02(B)(3) (Baldwin 1988). This type
of relationship is not established if the two parties are sexual partners. See In re Adoption of Robert Paul
P., 481 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653, 63 N.Y.2d 233,236, 471 N.E.2d 424,425 (1984) holding that sexual intimacy
is utterly repugnant to the relationship between child and parent in our society. Id.
" Omo Rav. CODE § 3107.05(E), repealed by 1976 H 156, effective January 1, 1977.
' State ex rel Portage County Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 38 Ohio St.2d 144, 311 N.E.2d 6 (1974).
35 In re Doe, 167 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio Juv. 1956).
36 1n re Adoption of Baker, 117 Ohio App. 26, 185 N.E.2d 51 (1962).
3 In re Haun, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 286 N.E.2d 478 (1972).
3 In re Harshey, 45 Ohio App. 2d 97,341 N.E.2d 616 (1975).
39 Id. at 101, 341 N.E.2d at 619.
40 Id. at 102, 341 N.E.2d at 619. "The main purpose of adoption is to find homes for children, not to find
children for families." Id.
' In re Dickhaus, 41 Ohio Misc. 1,321 N.E.2d 800 (1974). 3
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require children of the same family to be adopted by one set of adoptive parents. 42
The court must consider the rights of the children, not the rights of the relatives.43
Child Custody Disputes
Ohio courts resolve custody disputes" under the "child's best interest"
standard.4 A parent's nonmarital sexual conduct is relevant and will affect a court's
custody determination only where a preponderance of the evidence shows that the
conduct is having or is probably having a harmful effect upon the child. 4 Cohabi-
tation with a person of the opposite sex is not enough to warrant a change of
custody.4 7 However, either violating a criminal adultery statute or bearing an
illegitimate child is sufficient."
Custody Disputes Involving a Homosexual Parent
The same "child's best interest" standard applies when the parent's nonmari-
tal sexual conduct is homosexual.4 9 If the conduct has a harmful effect upon the
child, then the court has denied custody or has limited visitation rights.'0 InRoberts
v. Roberts,"' the evidence reflected only that the minor children would be signifi-
cantly harmed if they learned of their father's homosexuality. 2 In Townend v.
Townend,13 the trial court granted custody to the grandmother because the mother
was involved in a lesbian relationship.'" The lesbian practices were "clearly to the
neglect of the children. '55 The Eleventh District Court of Appeals found the trial
court's determination of the mother's unsuitability to be amply supported by the
evidence.5 6
42 Id.
43 Id. at 3, 321 N.E.2d at 802.
1 Oro Ra'v. CODE ANw. § 3109.04(B)(1) (Baldwin 1988).
4s Gishwiller v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615 (1855).
4 Whaley v. Whaley, 61 Ohio App.2d 111,399 N.E.2d 1270 (1978) (emphasis added).
47 Id.
4 Beamer v. Beamer, 17 Ohio App.2d 89, 244 N.E.2d 775 (1969). Mrs. Beamer bore an illegitimate child
to a married man. The court found her conduct to be in violation of a criminal statute and an improper role
model for her children. Id. at 97,244 N.E.2d at 781.
49 Conkel v. Conkel, 31 Ohio App.3d 169, 172, 509 N.E.2d 983, 985 (1987).
"
0 Roberts v. Roberts, 22 Ohio App.3d 127, 129, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (1985).
51 Id.
52 The Franklin County Court of Appeals remanded the case to determine if visitation restrictions would
adequately protect the interests of the young children or if visitation should be terminated until the children
reach an ageat which they wouldn't be harmed by the knowledge of their father's homosexuality. Id. at 129,
489 N.E.2d at 1070.
'a Case No. 639, (Ohio 11th App. Dist. Sept. 30, 1976).
Id. at 2. The women had exchanged vows of love, had granted television and newspaper interviews and
were active in the Gay Liberation Movement. Id. at 3.
sId. The court listed examples of lack of supervision and proper clothing for the children. Id. at 2, 5.
"Id. at 5. The children lacked supervision, in part because the mother "had been so active in the gay
movement that it had engulfed her entire daily activities." Id. at 8. The court also expressed disapproval
of the presence of the two older children at interviews where the "entire subject of lesbianism [was]
extensively discussed in minute detail." Id. at 11.
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Ohio courts do not expect parents to be perfect, however.5 When dealing with
domestic relations cases, the courts must "recognize that all parents have faults[.]
[The court must] look not to the faults of the parents, but to the needs of the child.""'
The court may not consider the societal unpopularity of homosexuals.5 9 The
Townend court followed Alaska's lead in applying Palmore v. Sidoti60 to a lesbian
mother custody case.61 In Palmore, the United States Supreme Court noted, "The
Court cannot control suchprejudices butneithercan ittolerate them." 62 The law may
not be able to regulate private biases, but it cannot give them effect either directly
or indirectly.63 Social stigma, whether real or imagined, cannot be a basis for deter-
mining the best interests of the child."
Homosexual Adoption in Other States
Homosexuals are statutorily excluded from being eligible to adopt in New
Hampshire65 and Florida.6 6 In 1986, the Massachusetts Department of Social
Services initiated a policy that placed foster children only in "traditional settings."6
New York and California explicitly allow homosexuals to adopt.6 New York
Department of Social Services Regulations prohibit discrimination against adoptive
parents based upon their sexual orientation. 69 California considers homosexuality
as only one factor" in determining the child's best interests. 7'
In Arizona, an adoption applicant's bisexuality does not, by itself, make him
or her unfit to be a parent.72 The Arizona Court of Appeals 73 has held that the sexual
orientation of an applicant will not be the deciding factor in denying an adoption.74
The court distinguished between bisexuality, which is not unlawful, and homosexu-
" Conkel, 31 Ohio App.3d at 171-72, 509 N.E.2d at 985.
58 Id. at 171-72, 509 N.E.2d at 986.
59 1d. at 173, 509 N.E.2d at 987.
o 466 U.S. 429 (1984). The Supreme Court reversed this case where a white child was removed from her
natural mother's custody because the woman was cohabiting with a black man. Id. at 434.
61 S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
62 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. at 433.
63 Id.
6 S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d at 879.
6 N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (West Supp. 1987) (1987 amendment).
"FLA. STAT. ANm. § 63.042(3) (West 1985) (1977 amendment).
'Comment, Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption, 22 U. CA.. DAvis L. Ray. 1009, 1027,
n.123 (1989) (authored by Shaista-Parveen Ali) [hereinafter, Comment, Homosexual Parenting]. This
policy sets the order for placing children in homes as (1) with married couples with experience in
childraising, (2) married couples without experience in childraising, (3) single parents or unmarried
couples, and (4) gay and lesbian couples or singled. The foster-care applicant must also reveal his or her
sexual orientation. Id.
"See Id. at 1028-29.
'9 Rivera,-QueerLaw: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, 11 U. DAYON L REv. 275,392 (1986).
70 Comment, Homosexual Parenting, supra note 65, at 1029.
"' In Riverside, California, a 29 year-old homosexual, David Frater, was permitted to adopt his 17 year-old
foster son, Kevin, in 1983. 69 ABA Journal 152 (Feb. 1983).
72 Appeal in Pima Cty. Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 835, 151 Ariz. 335, 340 (1986).
" Division 2, Department A.
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ality, which violates Arizona law. 5
The exact number of homosexuals who adopt is unknown.7 6 Some homosexu-
als do not reveal their sexual orientation."7 Those who do reveal their sexual
orientation and have been rejected as adoptive parents may not want the publicity or
expense of an appeal. Some states permit such adoptions, and those cases in which
adoption is permitted are not always reported or publicized. 8
FACTS
Charles B. was born June 17, 1981. 9He was eight years old at the time of the
adoption proceedings.80 He suffers from leukemia, which was in remission at the
time of the hearing, alow I.Q. and a speech disorder.81 He also has impaired fine and
gross motor skills82 and has some stigmata or facial features suggestive of fetal
alcohol syndrome.83 The Licking County Department of Human Services84 gained
permanent custody of Charles when he was three years old.8 5 The agency placed
Charles in at least four different foster homes, but no suitable family was willing to
adopt him.86
Mr. B. first met Charles in July, 1986, when the agency recommended that Mr.
B. counsel Charles.87 Mr. B. and Charles developed a close, personal relationship
through the counseling.88 The agency permittedMr. B. to take Charles home during
several weekends and a long holiday period. 9
4 Appeal in Pima Cty, 727 P.2d at 834, 151 Ariz. at 339.
5 ARiz. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411 and 13-1412 (1989). "It would be anomalous for the state on one hand
to declare homosexual conduct unlawful and on the other create a parent after that proscribed model, in
effect approving that standard, inimical to the natural family, as head of a state-created family." 727 P.2d
at 835, 151 Ariz. at 340.
76 Rivera, supra note 69, at 391.
7 See H. CURRY AND D. CLFFoRD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY CoULEs 7:19 (1989). (Suggesting
that it may be more difficult to persuade the court that the adoption is in the best interests of the child if "your
sexual orientation is revealed.")
7' Comment, Homosexual Parenting, supra note 67, at 1032, n. 158.
79 Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 88, 552 N.E.2d at 884.
g0 d.
$1 Id.82 Id.
83 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Mr. B. at 2.
Hereinafter referred to as the "agency."
85 Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 88, 552 N.E.2d at 884.
"' Id. Charles' mental and physical problems make him less adoptable than other children. Id. at 88, 552
N.E.2d at 885. The agency registered Charles for adoption with several different exchanges for adoptive
children. Brief of Respondent-Appellee, Licking County Department of Human Services at 1.
8' Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 88,552 N.E.2d at 885. Mr. B. is a psychological counselor with a bachelor's
degree in childhood and adolescent psychology from Ohio State University and a master's degree in family
life education and human sexuality from New York University. He has one-third of the work completed for
a doctorate in psychology. Mr. B. lives with Mr. K., a research scientist. Id.
88 Id.
9 Id. at 89, 552 N.E.2d at 885. The agency knew of the relationship between Mr. B. and Mr. K. prior to
[Vol. 24:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Mr. B. filed for adoption of Charles on January 15, 1988.90 One day before
the adoption hearing, the agency submitted a non-consent statement to the court.9'
At the hearing, six witnesses testified in support of the adoption.92 Only one witness
testified on behalf of the agency.93 The court-appointed guardian recommended
approval of the adoption.94 The court found the adoption to be in Charles' best
interest and granted an interlocutory adoption order.95 The agency appealed on May
25, 1988, and Charles was placed in a foster home pending disposition of the
appeal. 96
Court of Appeals Opinion
The court of appeals reversed97 the trial court and found that, as a matter of law,
"it is not inthe best interest of a seven (7) year old male child to be placed for adoption
into the home of a pair of adult male homosexual lovers."9 Charles would not pass
as the natural child of the adoptive parents and would not "adapt to the community
by quietly blending in free from controversy and stigma." 99 This court found the
concepts of homosexuality and adoption to be so "inherently mutually exclusive and
inconsistent, if not hostile, that the legislature never considered it necessary to enact
an express ineligibility provision." ° In stating that the basic purpose for adoption
is to provide a child with the closest possible approximation to a birth family,' 0 ' the
court ignored past precedent that approved multi-ethnic adoptions.'0 2 The court
declaredthe gay lifestyle10 3 to be "incompatible with the manifest spirit, purpose and
goals of adoption.''01
Judge Wise wrote a strong dissent. Like the majority, he did not sanction or
encourage homosexual adoption. 101 However, he noted that the record contained"no
allowing the visitations. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant Mr. B. at 3.
"Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 89, 552 N.E.2d at 885.
"Id. This issue was not contested in the appeals. The trial court found that the consent was not required
since "the agency did not submit its statement withholding consent until after the statutory time limit had
passed." Id. at 89,552 N.E.2d at 885-86. The court of appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court agreed on this
point. Id. at 89, 552 N.E.2d at 886.
"See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
'4 Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 89, 552 N.E.2d at 885.
" Brief of Guardian Ad Litem, at 2.
% Id. at 2.
"By a vote of 2-1. In the Matter of the Adoption of Charles B., No. CA-3382 (Ohio 5th App. Dist. Oct. 28,
1988) at 16 (1988 LEXIS 4435, at 17) (unreported decision). Judge Wise wrote a strong dissent. See infra
notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
Charles B., 1988 LEXIS 4435 at 1.
"Id. at 1-2.
'I® d. at 2.
10 Id. at 6.
,o2 See supra notes 36, 38, and accompanying text.
103 The court did not specify any evidence in the record to support a finding of such a lifestyle. In fact, a
reading of the record shows that Mr. B. and Mr. K. have engaged in a long-term, monogamous relationship.
Charles B., 1988 LEXIS 4435 at 8.
I" Id. at 6. 7
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evidence from which the trial court could find the best interests of this particular
child would not be served by granting this adoption."'1 6 In fact, if the trial court had
denied the adoption, the court of appeals would "be constrained that such a decision
was against the manifest weight of the evidence."'"
Judge Wise pointed out that all adult male homosexuals do not pursue a "'gay-
lifestyle' anymore than all adult male heterosexuals pursue a 'swinger's-life-
style." '' l~ The focus must be upon whether the prospective parent's lifestyle is
detrimental to the best interests of the child. 19 Homosexuality does not defeat the
goals of adoption simply because homosexuality negates procreation." 0 The inabil-
ity to have children is one of the reasons for adoption."' One of the goals of the
adoption statutes is to remove children from long term foster care and place them into
a permanent environment."12
Ohio Supreme Court Opinion
Upon review of the Ohio adoption statute, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that
any minor may be adopted and that an unmarried adult may adopt."3 Therefore,
since Charles and Mr. B. each fit within the respective statutes, Mr. B. is statutorily
permitted to adopt Charles." 4 The court was quick to note that the right to adopt is
permissive and not absolute.115 The polestar is the best interest of the adopted child,
which is assessed on a case-by-case basis. 116 The trial court must decide adoption
matters through the "able exercise of discretion... giving due consideration to all
known factors in determining what is in the best interest of the person to be
adopted.""' 7
Mr. B.'s interest in adopting Charles never diminished, even when the agency
found a potential adoptive home for Charles."' Mr. B. understood and was prepared
to meet Charles' physical and emotional needs. "' Six witnesses testified to Mr. B.' s
"' Id. at 18 (Wise, J., dissenting).
'Id. at 22 (emphasis in original).
107 Id. at 22-23.
'08 Id. at 28.
109 Id.
iOd.
111 Id.
"'
2 Id. at 30. Judge Wise closed his dissent by quoting the testimony of an expert witnesses, Dr. Victoria
Blubaugh: "I think that he [the petitioner] is going to be a good parent. He certainly has behavior
management down. At this point, 1guess, just being real honest about it, my concern isn't so much that Mr.
B. gets Charlie, but that Charlie gets Mr. B." Id. at 31. (emphasis in original).
'13 Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 90, 552 N.E.2d at 886. OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.02 (Baldwin 1988)
provides: "Any minor may be adopted." Omo Ray. CODE AN. § 3107.04 (Baldwin 1988) provides in
relevant part, "The following persons may adopt: ... (B) An unmarried adult[.]"
"4 Charles B., 50 Ohio St. 3d at 90, 552 N.E.2d at 886.
'"Id. Both OmoRav. CODEANN. §§ 3107.02 and 3107.03 (Baldwin 1988) usethe discretionary term "may."
116 Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 90, 552 N.E.2d at 886.
'"Id. The court was referring to Orno RLrv. CODE § 3107.14 (C).
... Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 91, 552 N.E.2d at 887.
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qualifications as a parent.120 Only one witness testified on behalf of the agency.121
The agency's witness was their Administratorof Social Services, who had no formal
education in either social work ofpsychology. 1 She had only one one-hour meeting
with Charles and had not observed Charles and Mr. B. together.123 She testified that
Mr. B. did not meet the agency's "characteristic profile of preferred adoptive
placement."'2
The supreme court reviewed Ohio case law concerning child custody, and
although it distinguished these cases, it found that the "best interest of the child"
touchstone was a common thread. 125 Permanent placement of a child is "clearly
preferable to confining the child to an institution or relegating the child to a life of
transience... "126 The court approvingly cited an appellate court holding that
extraordinary emphasis on a single negative factor amidst otherwise outstanding
qualifications is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. 127 The supreme court con-
cluded that the trial court had not abused its broad discretion in determining that the
adoption was in Charles' best interest. 12  The court reinstated the trial court's
judgment and allowed the adoption. 129
Agreeing with the majority, Judge Resnick found that existing Ohio law does
not, as a matter of law, bar homosexuals from adopting children.1 30 However, she
insisted that it was not in the best interest of a child suffering from leukemia to be
placed with a person who falls within the high risk population for AIDS.
131
119 Id.
12 Mr. B.'s witnesses included: Dr. Joseph Shannon, a licensed psychologist, who holds a Ph.D. in
psychology;, Dr. Victoria Blubaugh, a licensed psychologist; Mr. B.'s motherand sister, Carol Menge, vice-
president of Lutheran Social Services; and the guardian ad litem. Id. at 93, 552 N.E.2d at 888-89.
2 1Md. at 93,552 N.E.2d at 888. The agency did not offer the testimony of the social workers who had worked
with Charles over the years, his foster home mothers, psychologists or other experts. Nor did the agency
offer the testimony of Russell Payne, the Executive Director, who authored the agency's "non-consent" to
the adoption. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 4.
122 Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 93, 552 N.E.2d at 888.
123Id.
"
2 Id. The agency had developed a list of requirements for the family that adopted Charles. Id. at 91,552
N.E.2d at 887. The requirements were: "a family of two parents with older siblings, at least one of which
would be male; a family with a child-centered life style; a couple with definite parenting experience,
preferably with adoption experience; parents with proven ability to handle behavior disorder issues; a
family that is open to counseling; and a family that demonstrates an ability to deal with learning disabilities,
speech problems and medical problems." Id. In the words of the Supreme Court, "a tall order, indeed." Id.
2 Id. at 92, 552 N.E.2d at 888. The Court approvingly cited Whaley v. Whaley, 61 Ohio App.2d at 118,
399 N.E.2d at 1275 (1978) where Ohio's position is that "... immoral conduct must be shown to have a direct
or probable adverse impact on the welfare of the child in order to justify a change of custody." Charles B.,
50 Ohio St.3d at 92, 552 N.E.2d at 888.
126 Id. at 93, 552 N.E.2d at 889 (quoting State ex rel. Portage County Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 38 Ohio
St.2d 144, 154, 311 N.E.2d 6, 13 (1974)).
27 Id. at 94, 552 N.E.2d at 889 (quoting In re Haun, 31 Ohio App. 63, 70, 286 N.E.2d 478, 482-83 (1972)).
128 Id. at 94, 552 N.E.2d at 889-90.
129 Id. at 94, 552 N.E.2d at 890.
103 Id. at 94, 552 N.E.2d at 890 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 95-96, 552 N.E.2d at 891 (Resnick, J., dissenting). Mr. B. tested negative for AIDS. AIDS is
preventable and can be controlled by personal behavior, such as a monogamous relationship with an 9
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While an adoptive parent's homosexuality is not a determinative factor, it
cannot be ignored.132 In Judge Resnick's view, the trial court must have sufficient
evidence to find thatthe prospective parent's homosexuality will nothave an adverse
effect upon the minor. 133 This will require the prospective parent to demonstrate that
the homosexuality will not harm the child. 13 The party who opposes the adoption
should also offer evidence which establishes that the homosexuality has or will have
an adverse effect upon the child.135
ANALYSIS
Relevance of Sexual Orientation
The Ohio Supreme Court has followed precedent in considering the sexual
conduct of a prospective adoptive parent only if it has an adverse effect upon the
child. 136 The best interest of the child, and not the adoptive parent, is the court's pole-
star.137 The cases are decided on a case-by-case basis. 13 The age and sex of the
children, 139 the discreetness or blatency of the sexual activity"4 and the amount of
additional homosexually-oriented activities'14  are major considerations. Ohio
courts recognize that denial of custody or adoption rights cannot be used as a
punishment for the parent's conduct.142 Courts cannot force their idea of morals onto
parents. 143 With social norms constantly changing, the court must refrain from
inquiring into competing moral value systems. 1'
Effect of Charles B.
Although homosexuals now have a right to adopt a child in Ohio, this case,
uninfected partner. SURGEON GNALs's Rm RT ON AaQUIaRE Mlmu N DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, UNITED STATES
DEPr. oF HALTH & HUMAN SmtvicEs, PuBuc HEALT S-vcms, HALnt REsouRcEs & SERviCES ADMInSTRA-
ioN 6 (1987).
Even if Mr. B. were to get AIDS, it is not spread through casual social contact between children and
persons infected with the virus. Id. at 24. Family members living with individuals who have the AIDS virus
do not become infected except through sexual contact. Id. at 13. There is no evidence of spread of the virus
by everyday contact, even though family members may share foods, towels, cups, razors or toothbrushes
or kiss each other. Id.
,' Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 94-95, 552 N.E.2d at 890 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 95, 552 N.E.2d at 890 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
"Id. This extra burden is unique to adoption cases. In custody cases, the only required evidence is proof
that the homosexuality will adversely affect the child. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
3' Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 95, 552 N.E.2d at 890.
M See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
Omo REv. CoDE AN. § 3109.04(C) (Baldwin 1988).
'3' Charles B., 50 Ohio SL3d at 90, 552 N.E.2d at 886.
"'See Ono REv. Cons ANN. § 3109.04 (Baldwin 1988).
"'See Townend v. Townend, Case No. 639 (Ohio 11th App. Dist. Sept. 30, 1976).
"' Such as participation in rallies and interviews. Id.
1' Whaley v. Whaley, 61 Ohio App.2d at 114,399 N.E.2d at 1273.
143 See Comment, Homosexual Parenting, supra note 67, at 1012.
4 Whaley, 61 Ohio App.2d at 118,399 N.E.2d at 1275. The court can recognize that such moral standards
do exist and that children are harmed by being raised in immoral surroundings. Id. However, the court must
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if read narrowly, could have little effect. In fact, evidence of this treatment became
evident within three months of the decision. The Brown County Court of Appeals
was faced with a custody dispute involving a bisexual father.'45 The court discussed
In re Adoption of Charles B., and stated:
Although not specifically mentioned in the supreme court's decision, a
relevant factor in that case was the total lack of any viable alternatives
to the petitioner's adoption. It obviously could not be said that the
proposed adoption was against the child's best interest when the only
alternative to adoption was permanent placement with the county and
a future consisting of repeated movements between foster homes and a
total lack of constancy in the child's life.1"
If courts continue to distinguish cases on this basis, the effect of Charles B. will be
dramatically curtailed.
In addition, few people will be able to duplicate the distinctive facts of this
case: (1) the highly qualified adoptive parent;147 (2) the special-needs child who
desires the adoption; 148 (3) the support system from the partner,149 and (4) other role
models in the extended family. 5 ' Future courts must determine whether these
factors are of equal weight and whether an adoption will be granted if any of the
factors are missing.15'
In theory, more adoptive homes will be available, and fewer children should
be "unplaceable" and therefore, relegated to a life of foster or institutional care. 15 2
An increasing number of older homosexual children who have run away or been
kicked out of their homes may now find a family to accept them as they are.
153
This case will not allow adult adoptions as a means of formalizing relation-
ships between homosexual partners. Cases such as In re Adoption ofHuitzil'5A will
continue to prohibit adult adoptions that do not meet the statutory guidelines. 5 5 The
legislature may confront the problem and incorporate New York's new definition of
"family" into family law. 156
examine the child's interests, not the moral values of the parents. Id.
I's Glover v. Glover, No. CA89-09-015, (Ohio 12th App. Dist., June 11, 1990) (1990 LEXIS 2291).
I "Glover, 1990 LEXIS 2291 at 14.
41 Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 88, 552 N.E.2d at 885.
I Id. at 88, 552 N.E.2d at 884-85.
149Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Mr. B. at 3.
5
o Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 93,552 N.E.2d at 889. Mr. B. 's mother and sister testified that they had built
a grandmother-grandchild and aunt-nephew relationship with Charles. Id.
' Which factors are mandatory? Would two factors be enough?
"z See State ex rel Portage County Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 38 Ohio St.2d 144, 311 N.E.2d 6 (1978).
LH. CURRY AND D. Cut ORiD, supra note 77, at 7:25.
'5 29 Ohio App.3d 222, 504 N.E.2d 1173 (1985).
'"See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
156 Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989). For purposes of
CHARL.Es B.Fall, 1990]
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Legislative Intent
On the other hand, the legislature may follow Florida and New Hampshire5 8
and amend the adoption statute to explicitly preclude homosexuals from adopting.
The Licking County Court of Appeals judges disagreed on the legislative intent
behind the 1977 adoption statute reform. The majority felt that "the concepts of
homosexuality and adoption are so inherently mutually exclusive and inconsistent,
if not hostile, that the legislature never considered it necessary to enact an express
ineligibility provision."' 59 The dissenting judge felt that "the legislature was ex-
pressing its disapproval of adult homosexuals adopting one another" by inserting a
new section which covered persons who may be adopted. 60 This view is more
realistic because it recognizes that the legislature was aware of the homosexual adult
adoption issue,' 6' but chose to sidestep it.
Tolerance of Minimal Homosexual Activity
The Ohio Supreme Court justices were less judgmental toward homosexuals.
Even the dissenting justice agreed that homosexuals can be effective parents.162 By
defusing such stereotypes as all homosexuals molest children, live a gay lifestyle,
raise homosexual children and are mentally ill,' 3 Ohio has taken an active step
toward reducing social intolerance of homosexuals. 164 As society has become more
tolerant of cultural and ethnic differences, so, too, will it become more tolerant of
atypical sexual orientation.6 5 The law should acknowledge a tolerance of minimal
homosexual activity. 66 Since the legislature is often unwilling to champion "gay
rights," the courts should develop and protect these rights. 67
Social Harassment
Unlike the court of appeals, the supreme court failed to address the contro-
rent-control laws, the term "family" has been extended to include "two adult life-time partners whose
relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and
interdependence." Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
'"See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
1s See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
"'Charles B., 1988 LEXIS 4435 at 2.
"' Id. at 27 (Wise, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 27-28.
"
2 Charles B., 50 Ohio St.3d at 96,552 N.E.2d at 891 (Resnick, J., dissenting) (citing Note, Gay Parenting:
Myths and Realities, 9 PAcE L. Ray. 129 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Gay Parenting]; Comment, Out of the
Closet and into the Courts: Homosexual Fathers and Child Custody, 93 DicK L. Rav. 401 (1989)
[hereinafter Comment, Out of the Closet]; and Comment, Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and
Adoption, 22 U. CALIw. DAvIs L. Ray. 1009 (1989)).
" See Note, Gay Parenting, supra note 162, at 144-148.
'Id.
" Miller, Rights of Homosexual Parents, 7 J. Juv. L. 155, 159 (1983).
'"RusE, supra note 23, at 250. "Minimal" homosexual activity is "homosexual activity between consenting
adults, in private, and unadvertised." Id.
" Comment, Out of the Closet, supra note 162, at 407.
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versy and stigma that a child adopted by a homosexual parent must face. The court
of appeals described its dilemma:
How will [Charlie] adaptto his community and respond positively to its
government when he matures, understands and fully comprehends what
was done to him by this adoption? On the other hand, what will be his
reaction if and when he discovers the law did not permit him to be
adopted by the only person who was willing to take him with all of his
problems? 69
Opponents of child custody awards to homosexuals argue that other children
ostracize and harass these children.170 Courts easily counter this argument in custody
cases by noting that the harassment exists because the child has a homosexual parent,
not because the child is living with the parent.' 71 Therefore, barring custody does
not solve the problem. 72
Although this rationale does not apply to the adoption situation, two other
counterarguments can be made. First, harassment may not be as prevalent as
feared.171 Certain neighborhoods are more willing to accept divergent lifestyles.
Children are more tolerant than adults and are being taught to respect individual
differences. Second, courts must not give effect to private bias or prejudice. 74 Ohio
courts have refused to consider the unpopularity of homosexuality when fulfilling
their duty to "facilitate and guard a fundamental parent-child relationship.' 7 This
rationale can be extended to the adoption situation. Few individuals go through life
without suffering the "slings and arrows of a disapproving society.' 7 6 The benefits
of a loving, caring home clearly outweigh any social ridicule which may occur.' 7
Questions Yet to be Determined
If the courts decide that all four factors 78 are not necessary, they must
determine which factors are controlling. Will only highly-educated homosexuals be
able to adopt? Will homosexual couples be allowed to adopt only those children who
are otherwise hard to place? 179 Will a court allow an infant to be placed in a gay
" Charles B., 1988 LEXIS 4435 at 2.
' Id. at 6. The court of appeals resolved this dilemma by concluding that "homosexuals must be ineligible
to adopt in any case." Id.
"" Comment, Out of the Closet, supra note 162, at 417.
171 Id.
172"Id.
'" See Miller, supra note 165, at 159.
174 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
11 Conket v. Conkel, 31 Ohio App.3d at 173, 509 N.E.2d at 987.
176 Id.
M Comment, Out of the Closet, supra note 162, at 417.
11 See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
9 The chance of a homosexual adopting a non-handicapped infant is "slim." I. CURRY AND D. CLFORD,
supra note 77, at 7:20.
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"family?" Will the court mandate that the child know or be told of the homosexu-
ality of the adoptive parent?
These are only a few of the questions that courts will face in future adoptions.
As the number of eligible adoptive children decreases due to increased birth control,
abortion, and more mothers keeping their illegitim ate children, adoptive children are
increasingly in demand. 180 Adoption waiting lists are already notoriously long.
There are simply not enough children to go around. Somebody is going to be
disappointed. In determining the best interests of the child, the courts must focus
upon the child's best interests, not the prospective adoptive parent's sexual orien-
tation.
CONCLUSION
A cry of alarm was heard in some neighborhoods when the Ohio Supreme
Court decided In re Adoption of Charles B. Couples who had been on adoption
waiting lists for years were appalled that a homosexual would "get a child" before
they did. However, these complaining couples forgot that Charlie is the type of child
whom they had once rejected or refused to consider because of his various problems.
When the best interests of the child permit an adoption that does not match middle
America's idea of the "normal family," shock waves abound.
Ohioans have slowly come to accept racial and ethnic differences. However,
to many, homosexuals are still at the bottom of the ladder. In giving homosexuals
the right to be a parent, the Ohio Supreme Court has taken an affirmative step in
changing society's attitude toward homosexuals.
Charles B. found the family for whom he had been looking. He now has a
caring, loving home that will provide the emotional support he needs. Ohio must
continue this trend by not confining the Charles B. decision too narrowly to its facts.
It is unlikely that this fact pattem can ever be duplicated. But, on a case-by-case
basis, other adoptions can be granted and other "Charlies" can find home.
DEBORAH MARIK
"I Id. at 7:20.
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